Fuel Poverty: The problem and its measurement. Interim Report of the Fuel Poverty Review by John Hills
Introduction
This report contains interim ﬁndings and 
issues for consultation from the review of fuel 
poverty and its measurement commissioned by 
the Secretary of State for Energy and Climate 
Change. The terms of reference for the review 
are presented in Annex A to the report. The 
remit of the review is for England, although 
its conclusions may also be of interest to the 
devolved administrations, and possibly more 
widely. The report draws on discussions with 
and evidence kindly submitted to the review by 
a wide range of individuals and organisations 
concerned with fuel poverty and with tackling 
it, and on detailed analysis by the review’s 
secretariat.
This report examines issues around whether 
‘fuel poverty’ constitutes a distinct problem, 
and the implications of the problems identiﬁed 
for its measurement. A ﬁnal report to be 
submitted early in 2012 following responses 
to this report and further analysis will present 
ﬁnal conclusions on these issues and on 
their implications for understanding the 
effectiveness of different policy approaches to 
the problem.
As discussed in more detail in Chapter 1, 
fuel poverty is an issue which has concerned 
campaigners since the 1970s or before and 
which became the subject of legislation in the 
Warm Homes and Energy Conservation Act of 
2000 (WHECA). This Act lays down that,
For the purposes of this Act, a person is 
to be regarded as living “in fuel poverty” 
if he is a member of a household living 
on a lower income in a home which 
cannot be kept warm at reasonable cost.
It also required the Government to publish 
within twelve months,
a strategy ... for ensuring, by means 
including the taking of measures to 
ensure the efﬁcient use of energy, that as 
far as reasonably practicable persons do 
not live in fuel poverty.
The Act set a maximum target date for this of 
15 years after publication of the strategy, so 
the UK Fuel Poverty Strategy published by the 
then government and devolved administrations 
in 2001 resulted in a date of 2016 for fuel 
poverty to be eliminated (in Wales the target 
date is 2018). The strategy set an intermediate 
target for 2010 for the elimination of fuel 
poverty within ‘vulnerable groups’.
The Act itself did not, however, set out 
how fuel poverty and progress towards its 
elimination should be measured. The 2001 
strategy document adopted a particular 
Causes of  
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deﬁnition of what constitutes fuel poverty, 
drawn from previous research on the issue, 
and governments have reported on progress 
against this indicator since then. The most 
recent analysis, published in July 2011, 
suggested that 4.0 million households in 
England were living in fuel poverty in 2009, 
with a projected rise to 4.1 million in 2011. 
This compares with 5.1 million households in 
1996, but a low point of 1.2 million in 2003 
and 2004.
In essence, the current approach deﬁnes a 
household as being in fuel poverty if it would 
need to spend more than 10 per cent of its 
income to achieve an ‘adequate’ level of 
warmth through the year and on other energy 
costs. The report examines in Chapters 1 and 5 
the characteristics of the precise measure used 
in more detail, but its key features are that:
t It depends on a modelled assessment of 
what it would cost to heat a home to 
particular temperatures, based on data 
from yearly structural surveys of a sample 
of homes and interviews with the people 
living in them, plus an allowance for 
other energy costs, based mainly on the 
average energy use of households for 
the number of people in the household 
and their dwelling size. It does not use 
actual spending, as that might reﬂect 
very low costs for those who are living 
at low temperatures, or very high costs 
for those who are wasteful in their use 
of energy.
t In 2009 space heating accounted for 56 
per cent of this assessment on average, 
and water heating for 10 per cent. The 
remaining third related to other uses 
(cooking, lights and appliances).
t It is based on the ratio between required 
spending and household income. The 
higher required spending and the 
lower income, the greater this ratio 
(particularly if income reported in the 
survey is very low).
t It uses a particular threshold, 10 per 
cent, whose origins are that in 1988 
this was twice median fuel spending 
as a share of income (that is, half of 
households then spent 5 per cent or 
less of their income on fuel, and half 
spent more).
While this deﬁnition has remained unchanged 
since it was ofﬁcially adopted in 2001, it is 
notable that the 2010 Energy Act additionally 
refers to reducing fuel poverty as potentially 
involving reductions in its depth – the 
difference between required spending and the 
threshold for being counted as fuel poor – as 
well as its extent (the numbers affected).
Is fuel poverty a distinct 
problem?
The ﬁrst question for the review was to assess 
whether there actually is a distinct problem of 
‘fuel’ poverty, requiring particular strategies, 
or whether it is simply a manifestation of low 
incomes in general. There are many other 
items – some of them equally important – that 
people on low incomes ﬁnd it hard to afford, 
but we do not have speciﬁc ‘food poverty’ or 
‘clothes poverty’ indicators or targets. Some of 
those giving evidence to the review suggested 
that measuring fuel poverty was as important 
in illustrating the impact of poverty, as it was in 
constituting a separate problem.
However, the overwhelming argument of 
those submitting evidence was that it does 
constitute a distinct problem. We survey this 
evidence (summarised in Annex D) and other 
material we have collected in Chapters 2 
and 3 of the report, looking in detail at both 
its causes and its effects. Reviewing this in 
Chapter 4 we agree that fuel poverty is a EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
warmth. However, a sixth would have needed 
to spend more than £1,750, and 9 per cent 
more than £2,000. This degree of variation in 
the fuel bills faced by similar households across 
the country is not to be found in relation to 
other spending requirements. For instance, 
although certain differences in the price of 
food for similar households exist, perhaps 
reﬂecting regional price differences, the 
disparity is much less signiﬁcant.
For those interested in establishing whether 
households have a lower standard of living 
because of their high heating costs, and so 
may be pushed into poverty, there is therefore 
a case for adjusting the way in which we 
measure incomes to allow for this. Some 
of the suggestions made to the review for 
measurement approaches that look at the 
‘residual income’ people would be left with 
for their other needs after paying their fuel 
costs (see Section 6.4) follow from this kind 
of concern.
Beyond the physical reasons why some may 
need to spend more to achieve the same level 
of warmth, a recurrent concern has been 
that some of the ‘poor pay more’, as a result 
of payment methods or contracts that are 
considerably less good than those achieved 
by others. While the premium paid by those 
on pre-payment meters by comparison with 
those on standard tariffs has now largely 
disappeared, those on low incomes are least 
likely to be on the cheapest direct debit tariffs 
(see Chapter 2). It is often those with the 
greatest ability to make price comparisons 
– including through the internet – who end 
up with the best deals. The current market in 
energy contracts does not necessarily serve 
those on low incomes well. It is disturbing 
that Ofgem has found that almost as many of 
those on pre-payment meters who switched 
suppliers as a result of doorstep sales did so to 
a more expensive contract than the one they 
had before as switched to a cheaper one. The 
distinct – and serious – problem. Fuel poverty 
is of major concern from three different but 
related perspectives: for those whose primary 
concern is poverty and its reduction; for those 
concerned with health and well-being; and 
for those concerned with climate change and 
reduction of carbon emissions.
The poverty perspective
The amount households have to spend is only 
ever an imperfect measure of the standard of 
living they can achieve, but for many things the 
same cash amount can translate into similar 
items in a shopping basket, meeting their 
needs in similar ways. The greatest exception 
to this is housing, because of the huge 
variations in rents and house prices across the 
country and the difﬁculty people would face 
in moving. Ofﬁcial measures of incomes and 
poverty rates take account of this by looking at 
them both before and after deducting housing 
costs. Equally, larger households need greater 
incomes to achieve the same standard of 
living, so conventional poverty measures adjust 
incomes to allow for household size.
As we discuss in Chapter 2, households 
also face widely varying costs to achieve the 
same level of warmth. These costs are often 
experienced in ways over which households 
have little immediate control. Further, bringing 
about change would need capital investment 
well beyond what they could afford. The 
primary reason for this is the poor level of 
insulation of much of the country’s housing 
stock, and the high costs resulting from the 
heating systems of some households, for 
instance if they are in rural areas or high blocks 
of ﬂats off the gas grid, or have inefﬁcient 
heating systems. As an example of the scale 
of this problem, the most recent fuel poverty 
assessment was based around a calculation 
implying that in 2009 the median required fuel 
bill for couples without children was nearly 
£1,300 to achieve an adequate standard of Fuel Poverty: the problem and its measurement
people’s lives, there is much less of a socio-
economic gradient for some of these outcomes 
than might be expected: they do not only 
result from low incomes.
Key elements in the evidence include:
t There are speciﬁc health consequences 
of exposure to low temperatures and 
the drivers of fuel poverty are signiﬁcant 
factors in determining the temperatures 
at which individuals live (Sections 
2.5 and 3.2). Health impacts caused 
by exposure to cold tend to relate to 
cardiovascular and respiratory problems 
at temperatures below 12°C and 16°C 
respectively. Low temperatures are also 
associated with diminished resistance 
to infections and the incidence of damp 
and mould in the home (which are 
also associated with lower standards of 
energy efﬁciency). These effects are most 
important for the youngest children and 
increase for the most elderly.
t Most dramatically, the UK has a higher 
rate of ‘excess winter deaths’ than other 
countries with colder climates (Section 
3.3). While the number in England and 
Wales has fallen from around 40,000 
per year in the 1970s to around 27,000 
per year in the last decade, this is 
comparable to more than ten times 
the number of transport-related deaths 
in 2009.
t There is clear evidence of an increased 
risk of cardiovascular-related death 
following days when the maximum 
outdoor temperature falls below 20°C. 
Low indoor temperatures appear only 
to be part of the explanation, however. 
Expert opinion suggests that around 
half of excess winter deaths may be 
attributable to indoor temperatures.
current measurement of the extent of fuel 
poverty allows for variations in prices between 
regions and payment type, but does not allow 
for these sorts of differences. Evidence on the 
overall effect of these problems is scarce, but 
new analysis by the review team reported in 
Section 2.3 suggests that if the poorest 30 per 
cent of customers in 2009 were, in fact, on 
the highest tariffs within each category, fuel 
poverty would have been up to 7 per cent 
higher than reported.
As a corollary of these poverty-related 
concerns, in terms of practical policy, the 
problem of low thermal efﬁciency of the 
housing occupied by some households on 
low incomes means that there may be cost-
effective and long-term ways of improving their 
standard of living through investment in energy 
efﬁciency, as well as through improvements 
in income. From some perspectives, giving 
such assistance ‘in kind’ is also politically 
more acceptable than simply increasing cash 
transfers through improving beneﬁts or tax 
credits. The ﬁnal report of the review will 
look at the evidence on the impacts of past 
interventions which have tried to achieve 
this. The implication of this kind of concern 
is that interventions should be targeted on 
households that both have low incomes and 
have energy inefﬁcient homes.
Health and social effects of 
living at low temperatures
Much of the original concern about fuel 
poverty stemmed from concerns about the 
health of those living at low temperatures. 
In Chapter 3 we review some of the most 
persuasive evidence on this. In interpreting 
this evidence, it is important to note that the 
ill-effects of cold come both from internal 
temperatures when people are indoors and 
from external temperatures when they are 
outdoors. In addition, and in contrast to 
evidence on many other adverse features of EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Beyond physical health, the evidence we 
review suggests:
t There is a link between low 
temperatures and poor mental health, 
with those living at low temperatures 
more likely to be stressed and subject 
to common mental disorders (Section 
3.4). The direction of causation is 
unclear, however.
t Social isolation amongst adults is 
associated with cold homes, while 
there appears to some association 
between cold homes, truancy, negative 
impacts on educational attainment and 
risk of anti-social behaviour amongst 
adolescents (Section 3.5).
t People with hard to heat properties may 
trade off other necessities to keep warm, 
at the most dramatic facing a choice 
of ‘heat or eat’ (with some evidence of 
reduced food spending at times of the 
very lowest temperatures by pensioners 
with the lowest incomes; see Sections 
2.5 and 3.7).
All of these problems are very good reasons for 
trying to ensure that people can and do keep 
warm. Their implications for measurement of 
the problem suggest a focus on establishing 
who is living at a too low a temperature, on 
actual spending on energy being below the 
amount required to keep warm enough, and 
on outcomes such as excess winter deaths 
or cold-related health problems. The overlap 
between low incomes and high heating costs 
which lies at the core of fuel poverty is one of 
the drivers of this, but there are other drivers 
as well, and they do not only affect people on 
low incomes.
t This problem is signiﬁcantly greater 
for those living in the coldest quarter 
of homes than those in the warmest 
quarter of homes. Using this difference, 
recent analysis attributes about a ﬁfth 
of excess winter deaths to living in cold 
homes. Even if only half of this is due to 
fuel poverty, that would still mean 2,700 
deaths – more than the number who die 
on the roads – every year.
t Beyond each premature death, there will 
be many more health-related incidents 
and associated costs to the NHS.
Precisely what temperature is needed to 
avoid these ill effects is, however, unclear (see 
Section 3.6). The UK Fuel Poverty Strategy set 
minimum temperature thresholds at 21°C in 
the main living room and 18°C in all other 
rooms, and this is embodied in the heating 
regime for measuring fuel poverty under the 
current deﬁnition. It is often said that these 
are the minimum temperatures to which 
houses should be heated to avoid negative 
health impacts, and that they are laid down 
by the World Health Organisation (WHO). 
In fact both the health evidence and WHO’s 
recommendations are less clear-cut. The origin 
of most of the references appears to be a 1987 
WHO review which found “no demonstrable 
risk” within a temperature range of between 
18°C and 24°C. We note that 21°C is simply 
the midpoint of this range. Given also that 
those with average and higher incomes do 
not appear to heat their homes to the ofﬁcial 
thresholds (see Section 2.5), we discuss below 
the extent to which the current fuel poverty 
measure is sensitive to these assumptions. 
From this perspective, it is very unhelpful for 
policy-making that data on actual temperatures 
inside homes are now 15 years old.Fuel Poverty: the problem and its measurement
One of these decisions relates to a signiﬁcant 
part of the current strategy to reduce carbon 
emissions – the forthcoming Green Deal and 
the Energy Company Obligation (ECO).  Under 
this framework, people will be able to carry out 
energy efﬁciency improvements whose capital 
costs are met through a combination of up-
front ECO funding (paid for by energy suppliers 
and recovered from energy bills in general) 
and a Green Deal ﬁnance charge (added to the 
particular property’s energy bills).  Eventually, 
once the capital costs have been repaid, people 
will beneﬁt from lower bills. However, almost 
by deﬁnition, this approach can only help 
people affected by fuel poverty to a limited 
extent in the short run: if they cannot easily 
afford their existing bills, substituting part of 
a bill with a repayment charge that offsets 
this saving would not solve their problem, 
even if it had national beneﬁts.  Lower income 
households will therefore need higher levels of 
up-front subsidy or even full subsidy in order 
to allow them to improve the energy efﬁciency 
of their dwelling.  The way ECO resources are 
split between measures directly beneﬁting the 
potentially fuel poor and measures aimed more 
generally at carbon reduction will therefore be 
crucial for the net effect of the policy package 
on distribution and on fuel poverty.
This discussion illustrates three general issues 
for those whose concern is with carbon 
reduction:
t It is important to understand the 
distributional consequences of carbon 
mitigation policies. Exacerbating fuel 
poverty could be one of those, unless 
this is offset in other ways.
t If this is not done, the adverse effects 
on those with low incomes could be a 
barrier to implementation of policies 
which have overall beneﬁts.
Carbon reduction and energy 
saving
The third perspective increasing concern about 
fuel poverty is its relationship with the national 
priority of reducing carbon emissions and 
energy consumption in general. Greenhouse 
gas emissions from domestic fuel consumption 
of UK households are currently 26 per cent 
of the national total (on an end-user basis). 
Improving domestic energy efﬁciency is one 
of the most promising contributors towards 
the 34 per cent carbon emission reductions by 
2020 established by the 2008 Climate Change 
Act and for the targets beyond to which the 
current government (like its predecessor) is 
committed.
In this context, current policy developments 
have some immediate implications.  We 
show how government policies both increase 
and decrease potential energy bills (Section 
2.4).  For example, ‘products policies’, which 
enforce better energy efﬁciency standards on 
producers of appliances, should reduce energy 
costs for all households.  Here there should 
be a positive distributional impact, with the 
greatest proportionate beneﬁt arising for low 
income households.
By contrast, those energy and climate policies 
that lead to higher prices will largely have a 
regressive impact.  The net effect of these 
policies will depend on how their beneﬁts are 
distributed (that is, who will receive the energy 
efﬁciency improvements they ﬁnance).  DECC 
analysis in 2010 on one set of assumptions for 
this suggest a net cost by 2020 equivalent to 
0.8 per cent of income for the poorest ﬁfth 
of households, but break-even for the richest 
ﬁfth (Figure 2.14).  Whether this regressive 
outcome – which would tend to increase 
fuel poverty – occurs depends on both more 
recent developments (such as the Warm Home 
Discount) and decisions yet to be taken.EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
t It can monitor trends, reﬂecting changes 
in the underlying factors driving it.
t More precisely, it can indicate what is 
happening to its extent and its depth 
(and possibly its persistence).
t It can help identify the kinds of people 
affected, so they can be targeted by 
interventions and/or offered appropriate 
assistance and support, both for overall 
policy design, and for ﬁnding them on 
the ground.
t By judging the effectiveness of 
alternative interventions, both at the 
design stage and after implementation, 
it can support policy design and 
assessment to choose the most 
effective policy mix for people in 
different circumstances.
It is immediately apparent that one single 
indicator may struggle to do all of this at once.
As far as trends are concerned, one would 
expect changes in an indicator to reﬂect the 
scale of changes in the underlying drivers of 
the core problem. So in this case, one would 
expect a fuel poverty measure to improve if: 
there were fewer people in poverty; if the 
energy efﬁciency of the homes of those on 
low incomes improved; and if the cost of fuel 
to those at risk of fuel poverty fell. However, 
a single measure may not by itself give an 
adequate description of what is going on. In 
particular, we may well want, as suggested by 
the 2010 Energy Act, to distinguish between 
extent – how many people are affected – and 
depth – how badly those people are affected. 
When measuring poverty in general, we 
distinguish between ‘headcount’ measures of 
the numbers of people below a poverty line, 
and ‘poverty gap’ measures indicating how 
far below that line people fall. It would, for 
instance, be judged by most people to be an 
t Improving domestic energy efﬁciency will 
be an important part of overall carbon 
reduction, but those on low incomes are 
unlikely to be able to afford or achieve 
this without assistance.
All of this suggests that a corollary of climate 
change mitigation policies must be a focus 
on those with low incomes with high fuel 
spending, and on those living in energy 
inefﬁcient homes in particular.
Synthesis
This discussion, and the evidence reviewed in 
more detail in the report, explains why fuel 
poverty is – and should be – a concern within 
different policy debates. Its causes, impacts 
and solutions make fuel poverty a distinct 
problem. It comes at the overlap of different 
concerns, some with poverty in general, others 
with health, and others with domestic energy 
inefﬁciency. Tackling it therefore offers a 
potential ‘win-win-win’ for different agendas.
A corollary of this is that the distinct problem 
that needs to be measured from all these 
perspectives is in some form the overlap 
between low incomes and high required fuel 
spending. In this light, the wording of the 
Warm Home and Energy Conservation Act is 
entirely appropriate: we are concerned with 
individuals in households “living on a lower 
income in a home which cannot be kept 
warm at reasonable cost.”  The implications 
of this for assessing the current deﬁnition 
and modiﬁcations or alternatives to it are 
discussed below.
How measurement can 
help (or hinder)
For any social problem of this kind there 
are several ways in which measurement 
– appropriate indicators – can help (see 
Section 4.2):Fuel Poverty: the problem and its measurement
arbitrary, although it is always hard to establish 
such criteria precisely, and the important issue 
is whether ﬁndings are unduly sensitive to 
such choices. In this case they are, as what the 
indicator shows is essentially the ‘tail’ of the 
distribution of costs in relation to incomes (see 
Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1). The number counted 
as ‘fuel poor’ is therefore very sensitive to the 
precise level of the threshold.
Further, as fuel prices change, the distribution 
of spending moves in relation to this ﬁxed 
threshold, and the numbers counted as fuel 
poor can change very rapidly. This can be 
seen in Figure ES.1. This shows the number 
of English households counted as fuel poor, 
characterised by the rapid decline between the 
start of the series in 1996 and 2003, followed 
by an almost equally rapid increase since 2004. 
For an indicator being used to assess the trend 
in the problem as described above and in the 
evidence submitted to us, this gives immediate 
pause for thought. Did the underlying problem 
of fuel poverty really improve by nearly four-
ﬁfths in just seven years – suggesting that 
it was well on the way to being solved with 
little further action needed? Equally, have 
things deteriorated quite so fast in the last six 
years to suggest that the problem has more 
than trebled?
The chart also shows the three key drivers 
of fuel poverty. First, it shows the number 
of English households in poverty, as 
conventionally presented by the Department 
for Work and Pensions (DWP). This number 
was relatively constant over the period 
(although the percentage of individuals 
in poverty in the UK fell somewhat, see 
Figure 2.1). Second, it shows how many of the 
homes of the 30 per cent of households with 
the lowest incomes had the lowest energy 
efﬁciency ratings (E, F, and G energy efﬁciency 
groups). This fell from 4.5 million in 1996 to 
3.0 million in 2009. If this was all that had 
happened, one might expect that fuel poverty 
improvement if those who were poor moved 
much closer to the poverty line, even if only 
some of them crossed it. We may also be 
interested in how long people are affected – is 
the problem persistent, or are many people 
affected over time, but only intermittently?
The current fuel poverty 
indicator
Chapter 5 of the report looks at the way in 
which fuel poverty has been measured and 
at how what it shows relates to these kinds 
of criteria. Before summarising some of the 
problems with the indicator as it stands, it is 
important to note its two key advantages. 
First, it is based on a combination of people’s 
incomes, energy requirements and energy 
costs, and so is sensitive to some degree to 
all three, as required. Second, it is based on 
a detailed assessment of a household’s need 
to spend, given their characteristics and those 
of where they live, and so avoids some of the 
problems that might be faced by a simple 
focus on actual spending. These are important 
advantages that should be preserved if the 
indicator is modiﬁed or supplemented.
However, the current deﬁnition is also open to 
a number of criticisms. Some of these relate to 
the precise way it is calculated, and some to its 
fundamental form, being based on the ratio 
between required spending and income.
In terms of its calculation, a key feature is the 
ﬁxed threshold of 10 per cent for the share 
of income taken by required fuel costs. This 
is derived from an original calculation that in 
1988 the median household spent 5 per cent 
of its net income on fuel, and that twice this 
ratio might be taken as being ‘unreasonable’. 
This threshold is therefore ﬁxed, and does 
not move as the spending and behaviour of 
households in general changes. The factor 
of twice the median level is also essentially EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
t It is highly sensitive to low reported 
incomes. Even surveys focused on 
income recording suffer from some 
mis-reporting of very low incomes – for 
example some people record zero or 
negative incomes – but this is a more 
serious problem for those with wider 
scope such as the survey used.
t It is also sensitive to the temperature 
thresholds used. For instance, using a 
living room temperature of 18°C, not 
21°C, would reduce the number of 
households by nearly 1 million in 2009. 
Conversely, using a higher temperature, 
as in Scotland for pensioners, would 
increase it.
One criterion for measurement is whether 
it can show the depth of the problem for 
those affected by it. In this case, although 
it is not usually the main focus of analysis, 
one indicator is the extent to which people’s 
required spending on fuel exceeds the 10 per 
cent threshold. DECC publishes some ﬁgures 
that present this. As discussed in Section 6.3, 
would have fallen over the period, and to have 
done so fairly steadily. The explanation of the 
‘V’ shape of the ofﬁcial fuel poverty measure 
lies in the third factor, real fuel prices, which 
fell until 2003, but have risen very sharply 
since. The particular way in which the current 
fuel poverty indicator is constructed means 
that it is the price index that dominates. But 
this means that over the period, the underlying 
changes in poverty and energy efﬁciency for 
low-income households have been masked.
One indicator of the sensitivity of the measure 
to price changes is the fact that, had the 
assumptions about fuel prices in the 2001 
strategy been correct, fuel poverty would have 
been in the range 1.0 million-1.6 million in 
2010, not the actual ﬁgure of 4.0 million.
The use of a ratio to determine the extent of 
fuel poverty leads to other potential limitations:
t In contrast to the focus of WHECA, 
some households with high (above 
average) incomes can be counted as 
‘fuel poor’.
Number of households (millions) Index of fuel prices (2005 = 100)  
Figure ES.1: Fuel poverty, income poverty, energy 
efﬁciency and fuel prices, 1996 – 2010, England (except 
prices – UK data)
Source: Fuel Poverty Statistics (DECC), Fuel & light Index Statistics ONS (scaled to real 
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an equivalent increase in state beneﬁts, 
for example.
Alternative indicators of 
fuel poverty
There are therefore issues about whether 
the fuel poverty indicator, as it is currently 
designed, adequately ﬁlls the roles it might 
serve. There are, however, problems with 
any indicator of problems of this kind, and 
alternatives may perform worse. Chapter 6 
of this report therefore looks at a range of six 
other potential ways of measuring fuel poverty. 
The ﬁrst three look at modiﬁcations to the 
current approach:
t A variant of the current indicator based 
on ‘after housing costs’ incomes, rather 
than on the ‘full income’ on which the 
main ofﬁcial series currently depends.
t An indicator based on the spending ratio 
relative to median spending in that year 
(rather than to fuel spending as it was 
23 years ago).
t A supplementary ‘fuel poverty gap’ 
indicator, as is, for instance, used in the 
USA (although based on spending need, 
rather than actual spending, as there).
Three more variants are considered, reﬂecting 
more fundamental changes:
t A residual income indicator – examining 
which households would be below a 
poverty line ‘after fuel costs’, if the line 
were adjusted in line with their required 
fuel spending.
t A direct measure of the number 
of households that simultaneously 
have low incomes (i.e. are in poverty 
according to the ofﬁcial indicator, after 
allowing for housing costs) and live in 
however, these numbers are affected by the 
presence of some households with very low 
reported incomes, which imply very high ‘fuel 
poverty ratios’, almost regardless of the level of 
their required fuel spending. Such low incomes 
can either reﬂect misreporting, or are genuine, 
but show that there are households whose 
current income falls so far short of the poverty 
line that they have severe problems affording 
all necessities, rather than necessarily having 
a particular problem relating to exceptional 
heating costs.
An indicator might help with the identiﬁcation 
of those affected in a way that would help 
those implementing programmes on the 
ground to ﬁnd people who might beneﬁt 
from programmes designed to counter fuel 
poverty. Many of the submissions to the review 
were clear that the current indicator is not 
helpful for this purpose, and indeed would 
be very hard to calculate on the doorstep. 
Instead, local authorities and others delivering 
programmes use proxy indicators, generally 
reﬂecting a combination of low income and 
poor energy efﬁciency.
Finally, an indicator can help the design and 
assessment of effective policies. One feature 
of the current measure is that it is a ratio – 
required fuel spending divided by income. 
A consequence of this is that it is far more 
sensitive to changes in spending than it is 
to changes in income. Near the 10 per cent 
threshold, for instance, a cut of £10 in required 
fuel spending will have as great an effect in 
moving someone out of fuel poverty as a 
£100 rise in income. Policy-makers may see 
the former as more effective, although the 
household would probably have preferred 
the increase in income. From the outside, 
the design of the new Warm Home Discount 
seems to reﬂect this concern, directly reducing 
the fuel bills of qualifying households by 
£120-£140 per year, and so having more 
effect on measured fuel poverty than would EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
appropriate, especially the regional 
distribution of fuel poverty.
t Using a spending threshold within the 
current ratio indicator that changes over 
time with median spending patterns 
would remove the extreme sensitivity 
of the current deﬁnition to fuel prices 
(Section 6.2). However, it could be 
argued that it would be inappropriate to 
remove all sensitivity to them. In total it 
would identify more households as fuel 
poor at the start and end of the period, 
and show a low-point in 2004.
t Using a ‘fuel poverty gap’ can give a 
very helpful sense of the depth of fuel 
poverty, measured both in pounds per 
household and in aggregate (Section 
6.3). It could supplement an indicator 
showing the extent of fuel poverty. Fuel 
poverty gap data at a household or 
population group level could also help 
policy-making and delivery. However, 
basing a fuel poverty gap on the current 
energy inefﬁcient homes, based on the 
‘SAP’ rating.
t Subjective indicators of whether 
households have difﬁculty in affording 
adequate heating or with paying 
their bills.
Aggregate trends in the numbers in fuel 
poverty under the main variants examined are 
shown in Figure ES.2.
Each of the six approaches has advantages, but 
also some shortcomings, which are discussed 
in more detail in the report. In particular:
t Measuring income after housing costs 
arguably gives a better picture of the 
true affordability of fuel bills (Section 
6.1). However, logically, the threshold 
used should also be adjusted to be 
based on after housing costs income. 
This means that aggregate trends are 
little changed, but there is a good case 
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Source: Fuel poverty dataset, 1996 – 2009, (DECC), English Housing Survey, 
1996 – 2009, (DCLG)
Note: there have been some changes in the methodology used to calculate fuel poverty 
statistics from year to year, which affect all the time series presented here. See Annex B 
for details of these changes.
Figure ES.2: Number of households in fuel poverty under all 
indicators compared, selected years 1996 – 2009, England





X X X X XFuel Poverty: the problem and its measurement
different approach from the current one 
and others we examine (Section 6.6). 
One advantage of subjective indicators 
is to cross-check the trends shown by 
other approaches (and it is striking 
that there has been a wide discrepancy 
from trends in the current indicator). 
However, individual perceptions may be 
very different from those of society as 
a whole, and many (particularly elderly) 
people may be reluctant to say that 
they face particular problems – ‘mustn’t 
grumble’. Responses also vary depending 
on precisely what question is asked. 
Such questions are probably most useful 
as a way of complementing other more 
objective indicators, and it would be 
helpful to incorporate relevant questions 
into the survey used to derive them.
Each of these suggestions therefore brings 
important insights into the issue addressed 
by the review, but still has shortcomings. 
We therefore examine in Chapter 7 whether 
it is possible to construct an indicator that 
builds on the advantages of both the current 
deﬁnition and of some of the alternatives 
described above.
One attraction of looking directly at the 
number of people who both have low incomes 
and live in energy inefﬁcient homes is that 
it reﬂects the intention of WHECA, that is, 
focusing on the overlap between the two. 
This captures what makes the problem of fuel 
poverty distinct from several perspectives. 
However, just looking at energy inefﬁciency 
(as in Section 6.5) fails to allow for other 
factors that affect households’ need to 
spend. The approach we examine therefore 
is to look at households who have both low 
incomes (as conventionally measured by the 
Department for Work and Pensions) and 
high costs (as measured in the current fuel 
poverty deﬁnition).
fuel poverty ratio indicator could put 
additional emphasis on observations 
that may not be accurate, and if used to 
generate an aggregate fuel poverty gap 
its extreme sensitivity to price changes is 
compounded.
t In essence, residual income indicators  
looking at who is poor ‘after fuel costs’, 
in the same way as we do ‘after housing 
costs’, are a more sophisticated measure 
of the extent of poverty, not a speciﬁc 
measure of fuel poverty (Section 6.4). 
They identify nearly all households 
that are low income, regardless of 
their energy requirements relative to 
others. The numbers identiﬁed as poor 
‘after fuel costs’ therefore follow those 
in poverty overall (as measured after 
housing costs), remaining around ﬁve 
million across the period. This kind of 
approach does have an advantage in 
terms of identifying the impact of high 
fuel costs for those on the margins of 
poverty, by identifying those who are 
pushed into poverty by higher than 
average required fuel costs.
t In many ways, looking at which 
households are affected by a 
combination of energy inefﬁciency 
(relatively low SAP) and low incomes 
better reﬂects the spirit of WHECA, and 
what many regard as the core issue 
underlying fuel poverty than the other 
approaches examined (Section 6.5). The 
series shows a small improvement over 
the period. However, the SAP rating of a 
dwelling is only an imperfect indicator of 
what constitutes reasonable costs, and 
does not reﬂect changes in one of the 
drivers of fuel poverty – energy prices – 
at all.
t Using households’ subjective description 
of the position they are in is a markedly EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
poverty, so the extent to which their required 
costs exceed a reasonable level will give a 
indicator of the depth of fuel poverty, what 
one might call the ‘fuel poverty gap’.
There are, of course, many different ways 
in which thresholds for ‘lower income’ 
and ‘reasonable costs’ could be set, but 
the example we explore has the following 
characteristics:
t The arguments in the evidence presented 
to the review for looking at incomes 
after housing costs are persuasive, so we 
use them.
t In line with current best practice, 
incomes are measured in the same way 
as DWP does for its Households Below 
Average Income (HBAI) analysis, in 
particular adjusted for household size 
and composition.
t Fuel costs are calculated as those 
required to achieve acceptable warmth, 
in the same way as they are for the 
The simplest way of thinking about this 
indicator is illustrated by Figure ES.3. Essentially 
WHECA implies that the households of concern 
are those that have both a ‘lower income’, 
that is have incomes below some threshold, 
and required costs above a ‘reasonable’ level. 
This is those households in the lower left 
quadrant of the diagram. All of those with 
incomes below the income threshold – the two 
left-hand quadrants – are of concern in terms 
of their risk of being in poverty. All of those 
with required energy costs above a reasonable 
level – the two lower quadrants – are of 
concern because of their potential contribution 
to overall energy consumption and carbon 
emissions. But it is those for whom these two 
problems overlap that are affected by the 
speciﬁc and additional problem of fuel poverty 
as people normally understand it. Our ﬁnal 
report will look at how different policies might 
affect the households in different quadrants.
Furthermore, just as the extent to which 
people’s incomes fall short of a poverty line 






















Figure ES.3: Fuel poverty deﬁned as the overlap between 
low income and high energy costsFuel Poverty: the problem and its measurement
the number of people affected by fuel poverty, 
than the number of households, removing the 
way in which the current indicator gives less 
weight to the problems of larger households, 
particularly those with children.
On this basis, a calculation of who would 







This gives the more detailed interpretation 
shown in Figure ES.4. This deﬁnition reﬂects 
how some people with slightly higher incomes 
are pushed into poverty by the high level of 
their required costs – (represented by the 
triangular area on the right of the shaded 
area). If energy prices are high, there will be 
more people in this position, and the income 
current fuel poverty indicator (focusing 
on need, not actual spending).
t It looks at household energy costs 
relative to a threshold based on 
the median spending needs of the 
population as a whole (see Box 7.2 
in Chapter 7 for a discussion of the 
rationale for this).
t It takes account of the way in which 
those with high fuel costs can be pulled 
into poverty.
t It embodies a separate indicator of the 
depth of fuel poverty – a ‘fuel poverty 
gap’ – for fuel poor households on 
average and in aggregate, alongside the 
conventional indicator of its extent.
Although we have not been able to do this 
here, ideally the costs used should reﬂect the 
prices actually paid by people at risk of fuel 
poverty (that is, the actual tariffs they are 
charged). It would also be better to look at 










Figure ES.4: Calculation of the ‘fuel poverty gap’
Income threshold
Fuel poverty gap
Fuel poverty gapEXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Figure ES.5 shows how the number of 
households and of individuals and the fuel 
poverty gap implied by this deﬁnition would 
have moved since 1996 by comparison with 
the numbers shown by the current deﬁntion. In 
1996, 2.9 million households would have been 
classed as ‘fuel poor’, falling to 2.8 million in 
2004 and 2.7 million in 2009. The average 
number of households classed as fuel poor 
over the period would be very similar to those 
counted by the current deﬁnition. However, 
the slow downward trend it shows may give a 
much better representation of the scale of the 
underlying problem than the ‘V’ shape from 
the current deﬁnition. It is the average fuel 
poverty gap that moves with energy prices – 
falling from £413 in 1996 (at 2009 prices) to 
£256 in 2004, but rising to £409 in 2009 (an 
aggregate amount of £1.1 billion).
Chapter 7 of the report discusses this indicator 
in more detail suggesting that it has a number 
of advantages by comparison with the current 
deﬁnition, while retaining its fundamental basis 
in an assessment of required energy spending:
threshold itself will be higher, as median 
required spending would rise. These factors 
would mean more people would be counted 
by the indicator as ‘fuel poor’ if energy prices 
rose in relation to incomes, but the count 
of the number affected would be much less 
sensitive than under the current formula. The 
ﬁgure shows how the ‘fuel poverty gap’ – the 
difference between required costs and median 
required costs – could be calculated. This will 
also change as fuel prices change.
Note also that the choice of median required 
costs to deﬁne ‘reasonable costs’ means that 
the threshold moves in line with costs for the 
population as a whole (as suggested by those 
proposing a relative version of the current ratio 
indicator discussed in Section 6.2). Given that 
those on low incomes are counted as being in 
poverty if their total income is below 60 per 
cent of the national median, using median 
costs as the threshold is in fact quite a high 
threshold for those with such low incomes, 
who are likely to be living in smaller properties 
than the national average. They are getting by 
on incomes well below those of most others, 
but are counted here as having unreasonable 



















Low income – high
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Fuel poverty gap
(£ billion, 2009 prices) 
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costs indicator
Figure ES.5: Number of households in fuel poverty under 
current indicator and low income high cost indicator, 1996 
and 2003 – 2009, England
Source: Fuel poverty data, 1996 and 2003 – 2009 (DECC)
Number of households (millions) Fuel poverty gap (£ billion, 2009 prices)Fuel Poverty: the problem and its measurement
t There are some households with very 
low reported that are currently classed 
as fuel poor, even though they have very 
energy efﬁcient homes. They are clearly 
a high priority for assistance to take 
them out of deep poverty, but it is not 
clear that it is helpful to class them as 
fuel poor. They would not be counted as 
such under this alternative.
Conclusions
The evidence we have examined and presented 
conﬁrms that fuel poverty is a distinct and 
serious problem. It deserves and requires 
attention, as recognised by Parliament when 
it adopted the Warm Homes and Energy 
Conservation Act 2000.
The Act captures, in our view correctly, the core 
of the problem as being the overlap between 
low income and high costs. As it states, a 
household is affected by fuel poverty if it has 
a lower income and faces above reasonable 
costs – which will often be for reasons outside 
its control – to achieve adequate warmth. Fuel 
poverty is a priority for a range of coinciding 
concerns, including poverty alleviation, 
health and well-being, energy efﬁciency and 
carbon saving:
t Our calculation is that households in or 
on the margins of poverty faced extra 
costs to keep warm above those for 
typical households with much higher 
incomes adding up to £1.1 billion 
in 2009.
t Living in cold homes has a series of 
effects on illness and mental health. But 
at the top of the iceberg of these effects 
is the way in which Britain has unusually 
high rates of ‘excess winter deaths’. Even 
if only a tenth of them are due directly 
to fuel poverty, that means that 2,700 
people in England and Wales are dying 
t It allows separate calculation of the 
extent of fuel poverty (the number fuel 
poor) and the depth of the problem 
(the fuel poverty gap), rather than 
conﬂating them.
t Calculating the extent of fuel poverty in 
this way is more robust than the current 
deﬁnition, both to data problems (such 
as mis-reporting of low incomes) and 
to the assumptions used in calculating 
required spending (such as the precise 
temperatures used).
t Because the indicator is much more 
stable in who is identiﬁed as fuel poor, it 
is also much more stable in which people 
are identiﬁed as being at risk of fuel 
poverty than the current indicator. Under 
the current deﬁnition, many households 
with low incomes and relatively high 
energy requirements were counted as 
not being fuel poor in 2004 (Figure 7.5).
t Correspondingly, interventions that were 
targeted at households that might have 
been thought in common sense terms 
to be at risk were assessed as beneﬁting 
people outside the target group, 
potentially giving a misleadingly gloomy 
assessment of their effectiveness. An 
overlap indicator should avoid this 
problem.
t The use of a fuel poverty gap indicator 
also allows the impact of some 
interventions to be seen, even if they 
do not quite bring someone across 
the line that would bring them out of 
fuel poverty.
t However, the impact of interventions 
that only affect incomes without taking 
a household across the threshold 
would reduce the depth of poverty, as 
conventionally measured, not generally 
the depth of fuel poverty.EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
million to 4.8 million individuals) affected by 
such a serious problem over thirteen years is 
deeply disappointing, as is the major increase 
in the depth of the problem in the last six 
years, as measured by the fuel poverty gap. 
It is hardly on track for its elimination in five 
years’ time.
As the report explains, there are different 
ways of looking at this problem, and different 
choices that could be made if the approach 
we propose was implemented. We would 
welcome views on the analysis and ideas 
presented in this report. We have included 
some specific questions for consultation in 
Chapter 8. In the final report we will discuss 
the responses to these and how they inform 
our final recommendations. We will also 
consider the implications of our approach for 
understanding the effectiveness of the range 
of policy interventions available to tackle 
fuel poverty.
each year as a result – more than the 
number killed in traffic accidents.
•	 It is essential that we improve the 
energy efficiency of the whole housing 
stock. But those on low incomes in 
the worst housing can neither afford 
the immediate investment needed 
nor afford later repayments without 
additional help.
Doing something about these problems is 
obviously the priority. However to support 
action we need good measurement. Although 
the current definition has the key strength 
that it focuses on required, not actual, energy 
spend, its precise form – based on a ratio 
against a fixed threshold – gives it certain 
weaknesses. It generates, for instance, a 
pattern of trends over the last fifteen years – a 
rapid decline followed by an equally rapid rise 
– which does not reflect what happened in the 
underlying causes of the problem, and is not 
always helpful in designing or evaluating policy. 
It is also highly sensitive to the assumptions 
and data on which it is based.
After examining a series of possible 
modifications or alternatives to the current 
approach, we conclude that while they 
each bring insights into understanding the 
problem, they also have weaknesses. We have 
therefore put forward an alternative approach 
to measuring fuel poverty, drawing on these 
insights, which more directly measures what is 
described in the Act and in everyday discussion 
of what fuel poverty is and how to tackle it – 
looking at those who both have low incomes 
and high costs.
Looked at in this way, the underlying problem 
of fuel poverty did not almost disappear in 
the early 2000s, but nor has progress almost 
entirely been reversed. This is not necessarily 
a huge comfort: a reduction only from 2.9 
million to 2.7 million households (and from 5.1 